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ABSTRACT
Model checkers like Spin can handle closed reactive systems, only. Thus to handle open systems, in particular
when using assume-guarantee reasoning, we need to be able to close (sub-)systems, which is commonly done
by adding an environment process. For models with asynchronous message-passing communication, however,
modelling the environment as separate process will lead to a combinatorial explosion caused by all combinations
of messages in the input queues.
In this paper we describe the implementation of a tool which automatically closes DTPromela translations of
SDL-specifications by embedding the timed chaotic environment into the system. To corroborate the usefulness
of our approach, we compare the state space of models closed by embedding chaos with the state space of the
same models closed with chaos as external environment process on some simple models and on a case study
from a wireless ATM medium-access protocol.
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1. Introduction
Model checking is becoming an increasingly important part of the software design process [10]. Modern
commercial SDL design tools like ObjectGeode [30] and the TAU SDL suite [1] allow validation of
SDL specifications through simulation and testing. Since errors in the telecommunication systems are
expensive, there is a need for additional ways of verification and debugging, and model checking of
SDL specifications is an area of active research, cf. e.g. [19, 6, 4, 21, 22, 18, 35].
Despite all algorithmic advances in model checking techniques and progress in raw computing power,
however, the state explosion problem limits the applicability of model-checking [8, 31, 9] and thus de-
composition and abstraction are indispensable when confronted with checking large designs. Following
a decompositional approach and after singling out a subcomponent to check in isolation, the next step
often is to close the subcomponent with an environment, since most model checkers cannot handle
open systems.
Closing is generally done by adding an overapproximation of the real environment in the form of
an external process. To allow the transfer of positive verification results from the constructed closed
model to the real system, the environment process must be a safe abstraction [12, 13] of the real
2environment, i.e., it must exhibit at least all the behaviour of the real environment. In the simplest
case this means the closing environment behaves chaotically.
In an asynchronous communication model, just adding an external chaos process will not work,
since injecting arbitrary message streams to the unbounded input queues will immediately lead to an
infinite state space, unless some restrictions on the environment behaviour or on the maximal queue
length are imposed in the closing process. Even so, external chaos results in a combinatorial explosion
caused by all combinations of messages in the input queues.
In [32], we describe a simple approach which avoids the state-space penalty in the queues by “embed-
ding” the external chaos into the component under consideration. We use data abstraction, condensing
data from outside into a single abstract value to deal with the infinity of environmental data. By re-
moving reception of chaotic data, we nevertheless must take into account the cone of influence of the
removed statements, lest we get less behaviour than before. Therefore, we use data-flow analysis to
detect instances of chaotically influenced variables and timers. Furthermore, since we are dealing with
the discrete-time semantics [22, 4] of SDL, special care must be taken to ensure that the chaos also
shows more behaviour wrt. timing issues such as timeouts and time progress. Using the result of the
analysis, the transformation yields a closed system which is a safe abstraction of the original one in
terms of traces.
Based on these earlier theoretical results, the main contribution of this paper is the description of a
tool implementing the embedded closing ideas and the presentation of experimental results that cor-
roborate the usefulness of the approach. The implementation is targeted towards the verification with
DTSpin, a discrete time extension of the well-known Spin model checker, therefore we chose to close
DTPromela translations of SDL specifications. The experiments performed with DTSpin confirmed
that the proposed method leads to a significant reduction of the state space and the verification time.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the following Section 2, we sketch the formal
background of the method. Afterwards, in Sections 3 and 4, we present the toolset we use, its
extension, and the experimental results of a few smaller examples as well as the results on a larger
case study. We conclude in Section 5 with discussing related work.
2. Embedding chaos
In this section, we recapitulate the ideas underlying the program transformation to yield a closed
system. A more detailed account of the underlying theory can be found in [32]. We start with fixing
syntax and semantics and proceed with program transformation and data-flow analysis required for
the transformation.
2.1 Semantics
Our operational model is based on asynchronously communicating state machines (processes) with
top-level concurrency. Since we take SDL as a source language and DTPromela as a target one, the
operational model gives the semantics of a subset of SDL that does not allow procedure calls and
dynamic process creation, and also suits as semantics for a subset of DTPromela that is a target of
translation from if to DTPromela.
A program Prog is given as the parallel composition Πni=1Pi of a finite number of processes. A process
P is described by a four-tuple (Var ,Loc, σinit ,Edg), where Var denotes a finite set of variables, and
Loc denotes a finite set of locations or control states. We assume the sets of variables Var i of processes
Pi in a program Prog = Π
n
i=1Pi to be disjoint. A mapping of variables to values is called a valuation;
we denote the set of valuations by Val : Var → D. We assume standard data domains such as N,
Bool , etc., and write D when leaving the data-domain unspecified, and silently assume all expressions
to be well-typed. Σ = Loc × Val is the set of states, where a process has one designated initial state
σinit = (linit ,Val init) ∈ Σ. An edge of the state machine describes a change of configuration resulting
from performing an action from a set Act ; the set Edg ⊆ Loc × Act × Loc denotes the set of edges.
As actions, we distinguish (1) input of a signal s containing a value to be assigned to a local
variable, (2) sending a signal s together with a value described by an expression to a process P ′, and
3(3) assignments. In SDL, each transition starts with an input action, hence we assume the inputs
to be unguarded, while output and assignment can be guarded by a boolean expression g, its guard.
The three classes of actions are written as ?s(x), g B P !s(e), and g B x := e, respectively, and we use
α, α′ . . . when leaving the class of actions unspecified. For an edge (l, α, lˆ) ∈ Edg , we write more
suggestively l −→α lˆ.
Time aspects of a system behaviour are specified by actions dealing with timers. In SDL, timeouts
are often considered as specific timeout messages kept in the input queue like any other message, and
timer-expiration consequently is seen as adding a timeout-message to the queue. We use an equivalent
presentation of this semantics, where timeouts are not put into the input queue, but are modelled more
directly by guards. The equivalence of timeouts-by-guards and timeouts-as-messages in the presence
of SDL’s asynchronous communication model is argued for in [4]. The time semantics chosen here is
not the only one conceivable (see e.g. [7] for a broader discussion of the use of timers in SDL). The
semantics we use is the one described in [22, 4], and is also implemented in DTSpin [3, 14].
Each process has a finite set of timer variables (with typical elements t, t′1, . . .) which consist of
a boolean flag indicating whether the timer is active or not, and a natural number value. A timer
can be either set to a value on(v) (rule Set), i.e., it is activated to run for the designated period,
or deactivated (rule Reset)), i.e., it has a value off. Setting and resetting are expressed by guarded
actions of the form g B set t := e and g B reset t. If a timer expires, i.e., the value of a timer
becomes zero, it can cause a timeout, upon which the timer is reset. The timeout action is denoted
by gt B reset t, where the timer guard gt expresses the fact that the action can only be taken upon
expiration (rule Timeout). A possible discard of a timeout signal is imitated by analogous action
(rule TDiscard).
In SDL’s asynchronous communication model, a process receives messages via a single associated
input queue. We call a state of a process together with its input queue a configuration (σ, q). We write
 for the empty queue; (s, v) :: q denotes a queue with message (s, v) (consisting of a signal s and a
value v) at the head of the queue, i.e., (s, v) is the message to be input next; likewise the queue q ::(s, v)
contains (s, v) most recently entered. The behaviour of a single process is then given by sequences
of configurations (σinit , ) = (σ0, q0) →λ (σ1, q1) →λ . . . starting from the initial one, i.e., the initial
state and the empty queue. The step semantics →λ ⊆ Γ × Lab × Γ is given as a labelled transition
relation between configurations. The labels differentiate between internal τ -steps, “tick”-steps, which
globally decrease all active timers, and communication steps, either input or output, which are labelled
by a triple of process (of destination/origin resp.), signal, and value being transmitted. Depending
on location, valuation, the possible next actions, and the content of the input queue, the possible
successor configurations are given by the rules of Table 1.
An input of a signal is enabled if the signal at the head of the queue matches signal expected by
the process. Inputting results in removing the signal from the head of the queue and updating the
local valuation according to parameters of the signal. In rule Input η ∈ Val , and η[x 7→ v] stands for
the valuation equalling η for all y ∈ Var except for x ∈ Var , where η[x 7→ v](x) = v holds instead. The
rule Discard captures a specific feature of SDL92: if the signal from the head of the queue does not
match any input defined as possible for the current (input) location, the signal is removed from the
queue without changing the location and the valuation. Unlike input, output is guarded, so sending
a message involves evaluating the guard and the expression according to the current valuation (rule
Output). In Output P ′ stands for the process identity of the destination and P is the identity of
the sender. Assignment in Assign works analogously, except that the step is internal. Receiving a
message by asynchronous communication simply means putting it into the input queue where in the
Receive-rule, P is the identity of the process and P ′ is the identity of a sender. We assume for the
non-timer guards, that at least one of them evaluates to true for each configuration.
The global transition semantics for a program Prog = Πni=1Pi is given by a standard product
construction: configurations and initial states are paired, and global transitions synchronize via their
common labels. The global step relation →λ ⊆ Γ× Lab × Γ is given by the rules of Table 2.
4l −→?s(x) lˆ ∈ Edg
Input
(l, η, (s, v) :: q) →τ (lˆ, η[x 7→ v], q)
l −→?s′(x) lˆ ∈ Edg ⇒ s
′ 6= s
Discard
(l, η, (s, ) :: q) →τ (l, η, q)
l −→g B P ′!(s,e) lˆ ∈ Edg [[g]]η = true [[e]]η = v
Output
(l, η, q) →P ′!P (s,v) (lˆ, η, q)
v ∈ D
Receive
(l, η, q) →P?P ′(s,v) (l, η, q :: (s, v))
l −→g B x:=e lˆ ∈ Edg [[g]]η = true [[e]]η = v
Assign
(l, η, q) →τ (lˆ, η[x 7→ v], q)
l −→g B set t:=e lˆ ∈ Edg [[g]]η = true [[e]]η = v
Set
(l, η, q) →τ (lˆ, η[t 7→ on(v)], q)
l −→g B reset t lˆ ∈ Edg [[g]]η = true
Reset
(l, η, q) →τ (lˆ, η[t 7→ off ], q)
l −→gt B reset t lˆ ∈ Edg [[t]]η = on(0)
Timeout
(l, η, q) →τ (lˆ, η[t 7→ off ], q)
(l −→α lˆ ∈ Edg ⇒ α 6= gt B reset t) [[t]]η = on(0)
TDiscard
(l, η, q) →τ (l, η[t 7→ off ], q)
Table 1: Step semantics for process P
Asynchronous communication between the two processes uses signal s to exchange a common value
v, as given by rule Comm. The communication takes place led for matching identities of sender and
receiver process. For τ -steps and non-matching communication steps are concerned, each process can
proceed on its own by the interleaving rules; each of these rules has a symmetric counterpart, which
we elide.
Time elapses by counting down active timers till zero, which happens in case no untimed actions are
possible. In rule TickP , this is expressed by the predicate blocked on configurations: blocked(σ) holds
if no move is possible by the system except either a clock-tick or a reception of a message from the
outside. Note in passing that due to the discarding feature, blocked(σ, q) implies q = . The counting
down of the timers is written η[t 7→(t−1)], by which we mean, all currently active timers are decreased
by one, i.e., on(n + 1) − 1 = on(n), non-active timers are not affected. Note that the operation is
undefined for on(0), since a configuration can perform a tick only if not timer equals on(0).
2.2 Abstracting data
Next we present a straightforward dataflow analysis marking variable and timer instances that may
be influenced by the environment.
The analysis uses a simple flow graph representation of the system, where each process is represented
by a single flow graph whose nodes n are associated with the process’ actions and the flow relation
captures the intra-process data dependencies. Since the structure of the language we consider is rather
simple, the flow-graph can be easily obtained by standard techniques.
The analysis works on an abstract representation of the data values, where > is interpreted as value
chaotically influenced by the environment and ⊥ stands for a non-chaotic value. We write ηα, ηα1 , . . .
for abstract valuations, i.e., for typical elements from Valα = Var → {>,⊥}. The abstract values
are ordered ⊥ ≤ >, and the order is lifted pointwise to valuations. With this ordering, the set of
valuations forms a finite complete lattice, where we write η⊥ for the least element, given as η⊥(x) = ⊥
5(σ1, q1) →P2!P1(s,v) (σˆ1, qˆ1) (σ2, q2) →P2?P1(s,v) (σˆ2, qˆ2)
Comm
(σ1, q1)× (σ2, q2) →τ (σˆ1, qˆ1)× (σˆ2, qˆ2)




(σ1, q1)× (σ2, q2) →P1?P ′2(s,v) (σˆ1, qˆ1)× (σ2, q2)
(σ1, q1) →P ′
2




(σ1, q1)× (σ2, q2) →P ′
2
!P1(s,v) (σˆ1, qˆ1)× (σ2, q2)
(σ1, q1) →τ (σˆ1, qˆ1)
Interleaveτ
(σ1, q1)× (σ2, q2) →τ (σˆ1, qˆ1)× (σ2, q2)
blocked(σ)
TickP
σ →tick σ[t 7→(t−1)]
Table 2: Parallel composition of P1 and P2







Each node n of the flow graph has associated an abstract transfer function fn : Val
α → Valα.
The functions are given in Table 3, where αn denotes the action associated with the node n. The
equations describe the change of the abstract valuations depending on the sort of the action at the
node. The only case deserving mention is the one for ?s(x), whose equation captures the inter-process
data-flow from a sending to a receiving actions and where Sig ext are the signals potentially sent by










f(g B P !s(e))ηα = ηα
f(g B x := e)ηα = ηα[x 7→[[e]]ηα ]
f(g B set t := e)ηα = ηα[t 7→ on([[e]]ηα)]
f(g B reset t)ηα = ηα[t 7→ off ]
f(gt B reset t)η
α = ηα[t 7→ off ]
Table 3: Transfer functions/abstract effect for process P
Upon start of the analysis, at each node the variables’ values are assumed to be defined, i.e., the
initial valuation is the least one: ηαinit(n) = η⊥. We are interested in the least solution to the data-flow
problem given by the following constraint set:






′) | (n′, n) in flow relation}
(2.1)
For each node n of the flow graph, the data-flow problem is specified by two inequations or con-
straints. The first one relates the abstract valuation ηαpre before entering the node with the valuation
ηαpost afterwards via the abstract effects of Table 3. The least fixpoint of the constraint set can be
solved iteratively in a fairly standard way by a worklist algorithm (see e.g., [24, 20, 29]), where the
worklist steers the iterative loop until the least fixpoint is reached (cf. Fig. 1).
6input : the flow−graph of the program




WL = {n | αn =?s(x), s ∈ Sigext};
repeat
pick n ∈ WL;
let S = {n′ ∈ succ(n) | fn(η
α(n) 6≤ ηα(n′)}
in
for all n′ ∈ S: ηα(n′) := f(ηα(n));
WL := WL\n ∪ S;
until WL = ∅;
ηαpre(n) = η
α(n);
ηαpost (n) = fn(η
α(n))
Figure 1: Worklist algorithm
The algorithm starts with the least valuation on all nodes and an initial worklist containing nodes
with input from the environment. It enlarges the valuation within the given lattice step by step
until it stabilizes, i.e., until the worklist is empty. If adding the abstract effect of one node to the
current state enlarges the valuation, i.e., the set S is non-empty, those successor nodes from S are
(re-)entered into the list of the unfinished one. After termination the algorithm yields two mappings
ηαpre , η
α
post : Node → Val
α. On a location l, the result of the analysis is given by ηα(l) =
∨
{ηαpost (n˜) |




Based on the result of the analysis, we transform the given system S into an optimized one, denoted
by S], which is closed, which does not use the value >, and which is in a simulation relation with the
original system.
The transformation is given as a set of transformation rules (see Table 4) for each process P .
The transformation is straightforward: guards potentially influenced by the environment are taken
non-deterministically, i.e., a guard g at a location l replaced by true, if [[g]]ηα
l
= >. Assignments
of expressions are either left untouched or replaced by skip, depending on the result of the analysis
concerning the left-hand value of the assignment (rules T-Assign1 and T-Assign2). For timer guards
whose value is indeterminate because of outside influence, we work with a 3-valued abstraction: off,
when the timer is deactivated, a value on(>) when the timer is active with arbitrary expiration time,
and a value on(>+) for active timers whose expiration time is arbitrary except immediate timeout: the
latter two abstract values are represented by on(0) and on(1), respectively, and the non-deterministic
behaviour of the timer expiration is captured by arbitrary postponing a timeout by setting back the
value of the timer to on(1) according to T-NoTimeout.
We embed the chaotic nature of the environment by adding to each process P a new timer variable
tP , used to guard the input from outside.
1 These timers behave in the same manner as the “chaotic”
timers above, except that we do not allow the new tP timers to become deactivated (cf. rules T-Input2
and T-NoInput). Since for both input and output, the communication statement using an external
signal is replaced by a skip, the transformation yields a closed system. Outputs to the environment
are just removed (rule T-Output2).
1Note that the action gtP B reset tP ; set tP := 0 in rule T-Input2 corresponds to the do-nothing step gtP B skip.
7l −→g B x:=e lˆ ∈ Edg
> [[e]]ηα
l
6= > g] = [[g]]ηα
l
T-Assign1
l −→g] B x:=e lˆ ∈ Edg
]
l −→g B x:=e lˆ ∈ Edg
> [[e]]ηα
l
= > g] = [[g]]ηα
l
T-Assign2
l −→g] B skip lˆ ∈ Edg
]
l −→?s(x) lˆ ∈ Edg
> s /∈ Sigext
T-Input1
l −→?s(x) lˆ ∈ Edg
]
l −→?s(x) lˆ ∈ Edg
> s ∈ Sigext
T-Input2
l −→gtP B reset tP−→set tP :=0 lˆ ∈ Edg
]
T-NoInput
l −→gtP B reset tP−→set tP :=1 l ∈ Edg
]
l −→g B P ′!(s,e) lˆ ∈ Edg




l −→g] B P ′!(s,e) lˆ ∈ Edg
]
l −→g B P ′!(s,e) lˆ ∈ Edg




l −→g] B skip lˆ ∈ Edg
]
l −→g B set t:=e lˆ ∈ Edg






l −→g] B set t:=e lˆ ∈ Edg
]
l −→g B set t:=e lˆ ∈ Edg






l −→g] B set t:=0 lˆ ∈ Edg
]
l −→g B reset t lˆ ∈ Edg
> g] = [[g]]ηα
l
T-Reset
l −→g] B reset t lˆ ∈ Edg
]
l −→gt B reset t lˆ ∈ Edg











l −→gt B reset t−→set t:=1 l ∈ Edg
]
Table 4: Transformed system
83. Extending the Vires toolset
The Vires toolset was introduced for verification of industrial-size communication protocols. Its ar-
chitecture is targeted towards the verification of SDL specifications and it provides an automatic
translation of SDL-code into the input language of a discrete-time extension of the well-known Spin
model-checker. Design, analysis, verification, and validation of SDL specifications is supported by Ob-
jectGeode, one of the most advanced integrated SDL-environments. ObjectGeode also provides






Figure 2: Toolset components
Spin [23] is a state-of-the-art, enumerative model-checker with an expressive input-language Promela.
In an extensive list of industrial applications, Spin and Promela have proven to be useful for the ver-
ification of industrial systems. Spin can be used not only as a simulator for rapid prototyping that
supports random, guided and interactive simulation, but also as a powerful state space analyzer for
proving user-specified correctness properties of the system. As standard Spin does not deal with tim-
ing aspects of protocols, DTSpin, a discrete time extension of Spin has been developed [3, 14], that can
be used for verification of properties depending on timing parameters. The extension is compatible
with the standard untimed version of the Spin validator, except for the timeout statement, which has
different semantics and its usage is no longer allowed (nor necessary) in discrete-time models.
if [5] bridges the gap between ObjectGeode and Spin/DTSpin. It contains a translator, sdl2if
of SDL specifications into the intermediate representation if. A static analyzer Live [27] performs
optimization of if-representation to reduce the state space of the model. if-specifications can be
translated to DTPromela models with the help of if2pml-translator [4] and verified by DTSpin.
The pml2pml-translator takes care of the automatic closing of a subcomponent and implements
the theory presented before. The tool post-processes the output from the translation from the SDL-
specification to Promela, where the implementation covers the subset of SDL described abstractly in
Section 2. The translator works fully automatic and does not require any user interaction, except that
the user is required to indicate the list of external signals. The extension is implemented in Java and re-
quires JDK-1.2 or later. The package can be downloaded from http://www.cwi.nl/~ustin/EH.html.
4. Experimental results
Before we present the results on a larger example — the control-part of a medium-access protocol —
we show the effect of the transformation on the state space using a few artificial, small examples.
9option buffer states transitions lost messages memory (MB) time
block 3 deadlock
loose 3 3783 13201 5086 2.644 00.24 s
loose 4 37956 128079 47173 3.976 01.97 s
loose 5 357015 1.18841e+06 428165 18.936 20.49 s
loose 6 3.27769e+06 1.08437e+07 3.86926e+06 170.487 4 min 04.74 s
Table 5: Different buffer sizes, unlimited number of signals per time slice
4.1 Simple motivating examples
In this subsection we take some simple open systems modelled in DTPromela, close them with chaos as
separate process and illustrate how the state space grows with the buffer length and with the number
of signals involved into the communication with the environment.
First, we construct a DTPromela model of a process that receives signals a, b, and c from the




:: envch?a -> proch!d; goto q;
:: envch?b -> proch!e; goto q;
:: envch?c -> proch!f; goto q; fi;
}
}
A closing environment will send the messages a, b, and c to the process, and conversely receive d,
e, and f in an arbitrary manner. As explained in Section 2, the environment must behave chaotically
also wrt. the timing behaviour. Therefore, in order to avoid zero-time cycles, the sending actions are
guarded by a timeout and an extra clause is added when no more signals are to be sent in the current
time slice. A specification of such an environment process is given below:
s: atomic{ if
:: expire(t) -> set(t, 1); goto s; /* stop sending
signals until the next time slice */
:: expire(t) -> envch!a; set(t, 0); goto s;
...........
:: proch?f -> goto s;
fi }
}
The queues in the verification model, however, have to be bounded. There are two options in Spin
for handling queues. The first one is to block a process attempting to send a message to a full queue
until there is a free cell in the queue. With this option, our “naive” closing leads to a deadlock
caused by an attempt of a process to send a message to the full queue of the environment while the
environment is trying to send a message to the full process queue. Another option is to lose new
messages in case the queue is full. In this case large number of messages gets lost (see Table 5). Many
properties cannot be verified using this option. Moreover, there is a large class of systems where
messages should not get lost, for this would lead to non-realistic behaviour of the system. Still, even
when this option is applicable, time and memory consumption grow tremendously fast with the buffer
size, as shown in Table 5.
We can avoid the deadlock in the system above if we limit a number of messages sent by the
environment per a time slice. For this purpose we introduce an integer variable n set to the queue
10
option buffer states transitions nemory (MB) time
block 3 328 770 2.542 00.06 s
block 4 1280 3243 2.542 00.10 s
block 5 4743 12601 2.747 00.24 s
block 6 16954 46502 3.259 00.78 s
Table 6: Different buffer sizes (4 signals per time slice)
n-messages states transitions memory (MB) time
4 3568 9041 2.644 00.22 s
5 8108 20519 2.849 00.42 s
6 16052 40569 3.156 00.75 s
7 28792 72683 3.771 01.36 s
8 47960 120953 4.590 02.45 s
9 75428 190071 5.819 03.86 s
Table 7: Different numbers of message types
size and modify the options of the if statement in such a way that sendings are enabled only if n is
positive; n is counted down with every message sent and n is revived every time before a new time
slice starts.
:: (n>0 && expire(t)) -> envch!a; n = n-1; set(t, 0); goto ea;
........................
:: expire(t) -> set(t, 1); n= BUFFSIZE; goto ea;
Verification results for the system closed in such a way are shown in Table 6. And again, though
more slowly than in the previous example, the number of states, transitions, memory usage, and time
required for the verification grow with the queue length very fast.
Next we fix the length of the queue at 4 and vary the number of different messages sent from the
process to the environment and from the environment to the process. Table 7 shows the experimental
results. Note that the growth of the state space of the system is now caused by the combinatorial
explosion in the queues. (The maximal number of messages that can be sent per a time slice is still
equal to the length of the queue.)
In the experiments for the same process with the environment embedded and not external, the
number of states is constant for all the cases considered and equal to 4. As one might have expected,
closing system by a separate environment process behaving chaotically, leads to a state space explosion
even for very simple small systems. Tailoring the environment process such that only ”relevant”
messages can be sent makes the environment process large and complicated, which can also cause the
growth of the state space or lead to errors caused by mistakes in the environment design.
4.2 Case study: a wireless ATM medium-access protocol
To validate our approach, we applied the pml2pml-translator in a series of experiments to the indus-
trial protocol Mascara [36].
Located between the ATM-layer and the physical medium, Mascara is a medium-access layer or,
in the context of the ISDN reference model, a transmission convergence sub-layer for wireless ATM
communication in local area networks. A crucial feature of Mascara is the support of mobility. A
mobile terminal (MT) located inside the area cell of an access point (AP) is capable of communicating
with it. When a mobile terminal moves outside the current cell, it has to perform a so-called handover
to another access point covering the cell the terminal has move into. The handover must be managed
11
bs states transitions mem. time states transitions mem. time
2 9.73e+05 3.64e+06 40.842 15:57.34 300062 1.06e+06 9.071 1:12.64
3 5.24e+06 2.02e+07 398.933 22:28.36 396333 1.85e+06 11.939 1:36.87
4 2.69e+07 1.05e+08 944.440 1:59:39.76 467555 2.30e+06 14.499 2:12.91
Table 8: Model checking MCL with chaos as a process and embedded chaos
transparently with respect to the ATM layer, maintaining the agreed quality of service for the current
connections. So the protocol has to detect the need for a handover, select a candidate AP to switch
to, and redirect the traffic with minimal interruption.
Composed of various protocol layers and sub-entities, Mascara is a large protocol. With the current
state-of-the-art in automatic verification it is not possible to model check it as a whole — the compo-
sitional approach and abstractions are necessary. Since the model of Mascara is not trivial, already
the state space of the obtained submodels with only several processes is large.
This protocol was the main case study in the Vires project; the results of its verification can be
found e.g. in [4, 19, 33]. Here, we are not interested in the verification of Mascara’s properties but
in the comparison of the state space of a model of the Mascara control entity (MCL) at the mobile
terminal side when closed with the environment as a separate chaotic process and the state space of
the same entity closed with embedded chaos.
The Mascara control entity is responsible for the protocol’s control and signaling tasks. It offers
its services to the ATM-layer above while using the services of the underlying segmentation and
reassembly entity, the sliding-window entities, and in general the low-layer data-pump. It carries out
the periodical monitoring of the current radio link quality, gathering the information about radio link
qualities of its neighbouring access points to be able to handover to one of them quickly in the case of
deterioration of the current association link quality, and switching from one access point to another
in the handover procedure.
In [33] we were closing MCL by embedding the chaotic environment manually. Not surprisingly,
verifying properties of MCL closed with chaos yielded false negatives first in many cases — the
completely chaotic environment was too abstract. Therefore, the traces leading to these false negatives
were analyzed, which resulted in a refined environment. The refinement was done by identifying
signals that could not be sent chaotically lest the verification property was violated, constructing a
specific environment process sending only these signals, and closing the obtained still open system
by embedding the residual chaos. The conditions imposed on sending the detached signals are in
fact the conditions imposed on the behaviour of the rest of the protocol, which formed later the
verification properties for the other protocol entities. Thus, by constructing the environment process
we only produce an abstraction of the real environment, keeping it as abstract as possible and leaving
the whole model still open, which means that the environment prescribes the order of sendings and
receivings for a part of signals, only. In this way, we could still benefit from embedding the chaos into
the process.
Of course, closing the system manually is time-consuming and error-prone. With the implemented
translator, it became possible to reproduce the same series of experiments quickly, without looking
for typos and omissions introduced during the manual closing. Moreover, we performed the same
experiments for MCL closed with the chaotic environment modelled as a process. In our experiments
we used DTSpin version 0.1.1, an extension of Spin 3.3.10, using the partial-order reduction and
compression options. All the experiments were run on a Silicon Graphics Origin 2000 server on a
single R10000/250MHz CPU with 8GB of main memory. Our aim was to compare the state space
and resource consumption for the two closing approaches. Therefore, we did not verify any LTL
properties.
Table 8 gives the results for the model checking of MCL with chaos as external process on the left
and embedded on the right. The first column gives the buffer size for process queues. The other
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columns give the number of states, transitions, memory and time consumption, respectively. As one
can see, the state space as well as the time and the memory consumption are significantly larger for
the model with the environment as a process, and they grow with the buffer size much faster than
for the model with embedded chaos. The model with embedded environment has a relatively stable
state-space size and other verification characteristics.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we described the implementation of a tool which allows to automatically close DTPromela
translations of SDL-specifications by embedding the timed chaotic environment into the system. Our
experiments performed on the Mascara case study show the efficiency of the chaos closing method.
Closing open (sub-)systems is common for software testing. In this field, a work close to ours in spirit
and techniques is the one of [11]. It describes a dataflow algorithm for closing program fragments
given in the C-language with the most general environment, eliminating the external interface at
the same time. The algorithm is incorporated into the VeriSoft tool. Similar to the work presented
here, they assume an asynchronous communicating model, but do not consider timed systems and their
abstraction. Similarly, [17] consider partial (i.e., open) systems which are transformed into closed ones.
To enhance the precision of the abstraction, their approach allows to close the system by an external
environment more specific than the most general, chaotic one, where the closing environment can be
built to conform to given assumptions, which they call filtering [15]. A more fundamental approach
to model checking open systems is known as module checking [26, 25]. Instead of transforming the
system into a closed one, the underlying computational model is generalized to distinguish between
transitions under control of the module and those driven by the environment. Mocha [2] is a model
checker for reactive modules, which uses alternating-time temporal logic as specification language.
In the context of the if-toolset [5], live variable analysis has been proven useful [27] to counter
the state explosion. Slicing, a well-known program analysis technique, which resembles the analysis
described in this paper, is explored in [28] to speed up model checking and simulation in Spin. Likewise
in the context of LTL model checking, [16] use slicing to cut away irrelevant program fragments but
the transformation yields a safe, property-preserving abstraction and potentially a smaller state space.
For the future, we will extend the subset of SDL our translator can handle, including complex data
types, procedures and process creation. Based on the results from [34], another direction for future
work is to the extend the pml2pml implementation to handle environments more refined than just
chaos with building an environment process communicating to the system synchronously.
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